Copenhagen interpretation can survive the upgraded Schroedinger's cat
  Gedankenexperiment by He, Guang Ping
ar
X
iv
:1
81
0.
06
85
8v
2 
 [q
ua
nt-
ph
]  
27
 O
ct 
20
18
Quantum theory has no problem consistently describing the use of itself
Guang Ping He∗
School of Physics, Sun Yat-sen University, Guangzhou 510275, China
In a recent publication in Nature Communications by Frauchiger and Renner (Nat. Commun. 9,
3711 (2018)), a Gedankenexperiment was proposed, which was claimed to be able to lead to inconsis-
tent conclusions with a self-referential use of quantum theory. Thus it seems to prove that quantum
theory cannot consistently describe the use of itself. Shortly after, Chen and Zhang suggested an
improvement (arXiv:1810.01080) which can made the explanation of the Gedankenexperiment be-
come consistent. Here we show that the original conclusions of Frauchiger and Renner actually came
from an incorrect description of the quantum systems. With the correct description there will be
no inconsistent results, even without modifying the original Gedankenexperiment.
In brief, the Gedankenexperiment proposed in Box 1
of [1] is a procedure among four agents F¯ , F , W¯ and W .
They repeat the following steps in rounds n = 0, 1, 2, ...
until the halting condition in the last step is satisfied:
At time n : 00, Agent F¯ measures a quantum system
R in state
|init〉
R
=
√
1
3
|heads〉
R
+
√
2
3
|tails〉
R
(1)
and denote the outputs as r = heads or r = tails. She
sets the spin S of a particle to |↓〉
S
if r = heads, and to
|→〉
S
≡
√
1/2(|↓〉
S
+ |↑〉
S
) if r = tails, and sends it to
F .
At n : 10, Agent F measures S in the basis {|↓〉
S
, |↑〉
S
},
recording the outcome z ∈ {−1/2,+1/2}.
At n : 20, Agent W¯ measures lab L¯ (containing system
R and agent F¯ ) in a basis containing
∣∣ok〉
L¯
=
√
1
2
(∣∣h¯〉
L¯
− |t¯〉
L¯
)
. (2)
Here
∣∣h¯〉
L¯
and |t¯〉
L¯
are defined as the states of lab L¯ at
the end of the first step, depending on whether r = heads
or r = tails, respectively. If the outcome associated to∣∣ok〉
L¯
occurs he announces w¯ = ok and else w¯ = fail.
At n : 30, Agent W measures lab L (containing system
S and agent F ) in a basis containing
|ok〉
L
=
√
1
2
(∣∣∣∣−12
〉
L
−
∣∣∣∣+12
〉
L
)
. (3)
Here |−1/2〉
L
and |+1/2〉
L
are defined as the state of
lab L depending on whether the incoming spin was |↓〉
S
or |↑〉
S
, respectively. If the outcome associated to |ok〉
L
occurs he announces w = ok and else w = fail.
At n : 40, if w¯ = ok and w = ok then the experiment
is halted.
According to [1], this Gedankenexperiment can make
the agents arrive at conflicting conclusions when they all
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employ the same form of quantum theory. Some main
points of the reasoning is briefly reviewed below.
(i) From agent F¯ ’s point of view:
Suppose that F¯ got r = tails in round n. Then ac-
cording to the above experimental instructions, she can
make the statement
Statement F¯n:01: “The spin S is in state |→〉
S
at time
n : 10.”
Agent F¯ could then conclude that the later state of lab
L is
U10→20S→L |→〉S =
√
1
2
(∣∣∣∣−12
〉
L
+
∣∣∣∣+12
〉
L
)
(4)
(as presented in the paragraph before Eq. (4) of [1]),
which is orthogonal to |ok〉
L
. Thus F¯ will further infer
that
Statement F¯n:02: “I am certain that W will observe
w = fail at time n : 31.”
(ii) From agent F ’s point of view:
Suppose that F observed z = +1/2 in this round. Note
that if F¯ got r = heads at time n : 01, she should have
sent F the state |↓〉
S
, which can never be observed as
z = +1/2. Therefore, F can conclude that
Statement Fn:12: “I am certain that F¯ knows that
r = tails at time n : 01.”
Then F can further infer from Statement F¯n:02 that
Statement Fn:13: “I am certain that F¯ is certain that
W will observe w = fail at time n : 31.”
This is because F infers that when F¯ got r = tails,
the state of lab L is Eq. (4) which can never lead to the
outcome w = ok.
(iii) From agent W¯ ’s point of view:
Agent W¯ can be certain that there will always be
(w¯, z) 6= (ok,−1/2), i.e., the outcomes w¯ = ok and
z = −1/2 can never occur simultaneously. This is be-
cause, according to [1], the state of L¯⊗ S at time n : 10
is
U00→10
R→L¯S
|init〉
R
=
√
1
3
∣∣h¯〉
L¯
⊗|↓〉
S
+
√
2
3
|t¯〉
L¯
⊗|→〉
S
(5)
(as presented in the paragraph before Eq. (6) of [1]),
which is orthogonal to
∣∣ok〉
L¯
⊗ |↓〉
S
. Consequently, in
any round once W¯ obtains w¯ = ok, he can be sure that
2Statement W¯n:22: “I am certain that F knows that
z = +1/2 at time n : 11.”
Combining with the reasoning in the above point (ii),
he can infer from Statements Fn:12, F¯n:02 and Fn:13 that
Statement W¯n:23: “I am certain that F is certain that
W will observe w = fail at time n : 31.”
Putting points (i), (ii) and (iii) together, we see that
once W¯ obtains w¯ = ok, there should always be w = fail.
Thus the halting condition (i.e., both w¯ = ok and w = ok
occur) in the last step of the Gedankenexperiment can
never be satisfied.
But according to Eq. (7) of [1], w¯ = ok and w =
ok can occur in the same round with probability 1/12.
Therefore, when this case indeed occurs, a contradiction
is reached. (See page 4 and Table 3 of [1] for full details.)
In our opinion, however, the contradiction actually
comes from the mistake in the above reasoning, not from
quantum theory itself. There are two different ways to
see where the mistake lies.
(1) According to some quantum interpretation theories
such as the Copenhagen interpretation, a wavefunction
collapses when a measurement is performed. Then the
above Eqs. (4) and (5) are not the correct description of
the corresponding states. To make it more obvious, let
us write the initial state of quantum system R that F¯
will measure at time n : 00 as
|init〉
R
=
√
1
3
|heads〉
R
+ eiθ
√
2
3
|tails〉
R
. (6)
When taking the phase difference θ = 0 it is exactly the
same as Eq. (1) that appeared in the Gedankenexperi-
ment in [1]. After F¯ measures it at time n : 00 in the
basis {|heads〉
R
, |tails〉
R
}, the Copenhagen interpreta-
tion implies that |init〉
R
collapses to either |heads〉
R
or
|tails〉
R
. Either way, the information on θ is lost. Es-
pecially, even there was θ 6= 0 at the beginning, after
the measurement the resultant state is still |heads〉
R
or
|tails〉
R
, which shows no difference from the θ = 0 case.
Thus, recovering the original value of θ from the resultant
state is impossible. Consequently, there is no reason to
believe that the later states of L¯⊗S should take the form
U00→10
R→L¯S
|init〉
R
=
√
1
3
∣∣h¯〉
L¯
⊗ |↓〉
S
+ eiθ
√
2
3 |t¯〉L¯ ⊗ |→〉S
with θ preserved in its original value. Instead, there
will be no fixed phase difference between
∣∣h¯〉
L¯
⊗ |↓〉
S
and |t¯〉
L¯
⊗ |→〉
S
. Therefore, after F¯ measured system
R, from the outcome she herself knows that L¯ ⊗ S will
be in a pure state
∣∣h¯〉
L¯
⊗ |↓〉
S
or |t¯〉
L¯
⊗ |→〉
S
with proba-
bility 1/3 or 2/3, respectively. But from agent W¯ ’s point
of view, as he has no information on F¯ ’s measurement
outcome before he makes his own measurement, he does
not know the purification of the state of L¯ ⊗ S. Then
the correct description of the state of L¯⊗ S is no longer
Eq. (5) (which is a pure state with a fixed phase dif-
ference θ = 0). Instead, L¯ ⊗ S will appear to W¯ as a
mixture (which has no fixed phase difference between its
components) described by the density matrix
ρ10
L¯S
=
1
3
(∣∣h¯〉
L¯
⊗ |↓〉
S
) (
〈↓|
S
⊗
〈
h¯
∣∣
L¯
)
+
2
3
(|t¯〉
L¯
⊗ |→〉
S
) (〈→|
S
⊗ 〈t¯|
L¯
) . (7)
For the same reason, after F measured |→〉
S
in the
basis {|↓〉
S
, |↑〉
S
} at time n : 10, the wavefunction col-
lapsed from |→〉
S
to either |↓〉
S
or |↑〉
S
, and the infor-
mation on the phase difference between |↓〉
S
and |↑〉
S
in
|→〉
S
=
√
1/2(|↓〉
S
+ |↑〉
S
) is lost. Thus, from agent W ’s
point of view, the correct description of the states of lab
L is no longer the pure state shown in Eq. (4). Instead,
lab L will be in a mixture described by the density matrix
ρ20L =
1
2
(∣∣∣∣−12
〉
L
〈
−
1
2
∣∣∣∣+
∣∣∣∣+12
〉
L
〈
+
1
2
∣∣∣∣
)
. (8)
With these correct descriptions, we can see that unlike
Eq. (4), now the state described by Eq. (8) is not or-
thogonal to |ok〉
L
any more. Thus F¯ cannot infer that
W will necessarily observe w = fail at time n : 31 as she
did in the above point (i). That is, the above Statement
F¯n:02 no longer holds, which also breaks down the logical
link between Statements Fn:12 and Fn:13.
Similarly, unlike Eq. (5), now the state described
by Eq. (7) is not orthogonal to
∣∣ok〉
L¯
⊗ |↓〉
S
. Then
W¯ can no longer be certain that there will always be
(w¯, z) 6= (ok,−1/2) as he did in the above point (iii). On
the contrary, when w¯ = ok occurs, both the outcomes
z = +1/2 and z = −1/2 are possible. That is, know-
ing w¯ = ok can no longer assure W¯ that there must be
z = +1/2. Thus the Statement W¯n:22 does not hold, so
that Statement W¯n:23 cannot be inferred either.
With these results, we can see that the reasoning in
page 4 of [1] is no longer valid, so that the statements in
the last two columns of Table 3 of [1] cannot be inferred
either.
In brief, if we take the point of view that measurements
will make wavefunctions collapse so that the information
on the phase difference is erased, then the key reason why
the Gedankenexperiment in [1] had led to the inconsis-
tent result is that the agents in the Gedankenexperiment
mistakenly described the states of the labs as pure states
(i.e., Eqs. (4) and (5)). But in fact they should be mix-
tures (Eqs. (8) and (7)). Therefore, when using Copen-
hagen interpretation and similar quantum interpretation
theories, quantum theory will not cause any inconsistent
in this Gedankenexperiment.
(2) On the other hand, in some quantum interpretation
theories (e.g., the many-worlds interpretation) there is no
collapse of wavefunctions. Then Eq. (5) can be taken as
the correct description. This is because agent W¯ can con-
sider F¯ and her particles as a unitarily-interacting closed
system, and thus conclude that the post-measurement
status is a coherent superposition. More detailedly, this
is done as follows. Let |init〉
F¯
⊗|init〉
S
denote the initial
3state of agent F¯ and particle S right before she measures
system R at time n : 00, and
∣∣h¯〉
F¯
⊗|↓〉
S
(or |t¯〉
F¯
⊗|→〉
S
)
denote the final state that F¯ obtains the output r =
heads (or r = tails) and sets the spin of S to |↓〉
S
(or
|→〉
S
). From W¯ ’s point of view, instead of applying the
projective operators {|heads〉
R
〈heads| , |tails〉
R
〈tails|}
on system R (whose state is in Eq. (1)) alone, at time
n : 00 lab L¯ = R⊗F¯ and particle S actually went through
a unitary transformation
U00→10
L¯S
≡ |heads〉
R
〈heads|⊗U h¯
F¯S
+|tails〉
R
〈tails|⊗U t¯
F¯S
,
(9)
where U h¯
F¯S
(or U t¯
F¯ S
) is a unitary transformation on F¯⊗S
that maps |init〉
F¯
⊗ |init〉
S
into
∣∣h¯〉
F¯
⊗ |↓〉
S
(or |t¯〉
F¯
⊗
|→〉
S
). Then the resultant state of L¯⊗ S is
|10〉
L¯S
≡ U00→10
L¯S
(|init〉
R
⊗ |init〉
F¯
⊗ |init〉
S
)
=
√
1
3
|heads〉
R
⊗
∣∣h¯〉
F¯
⊗ |↓〉
S
+
√
2
3
|tails〉
R
⊗ |t¯〉
F¯
⊗ |→〉
S
. (10)
Denoting ∣∣h¯〉
L¯
= |heads〉
R
⊗
∣∣h¯〉
F¯
(11)
and
|t¯〉
L¯
= |tails〉
R
⊗ |t¯〉
F¯
, (12)
we successfully obtain Eq. (5) from Eq. (10).
From this deduction process, it can be seen that if we
take Eq. (5) as valid, we actually accepted the following
logic:
For any agent (such as W¯ ) who knows nothing about
what happened inside the lab (e.g., which outcome F¯ had
obtained), the state of the lab should be described as a
quantum superposition, in which all terms corresponding
to all possible outcomes inside the lab are included.
But in this scenario, another problem will arise in the
original reasoning in [1]. As stressed in [1], all agents
employ the same theory throughout the Gedankenexper-
iment. Therefore, when agent F measures S at time
n : 10, from other agents’ point of view, lab L = S ⊗ F
should also be considered as a unitarily-interacting sys-
tem. Let |init〉
F
denote the initial state of agent F . Then
the unitary transformation corresponding to this process
can be expressed as
U10→20L ≡ |↓〉S 〈↓| ⊗ U
(−)
F
+ |↑〉
S
〈↑| ⊗ U
(+)
F
, (13)
where U
(−)
F
(or U
(+)
F
) is a unitary transformation on
F that maps |init〉
F
into |−1/2〉
F
(or |+1/2〉
F
). Here
|−1/2〉
F
(or |+1/2〉
F
) denotes the state of F when the
state of lab L is |−1/2〉
L
(or |+1/2〉
L
), i.e.,∣∣∣∣−12
〉
L
= |↓〉
S
⊗
∣∣∣∣−12
〉
F
(14)
and ∣∣∣∣+12
〉
L
= |↑〉
S
⊗
∣∣∣∣+12
〉
F
. (15)
Applying Eq. (13) on Eq. (10) (i.e., Eq. (5)), we know
that the resultant state of L¯⊗ L = L¯⊗ S ⊗ F is
IL¯ ⊗ U
10→20
L (|10〉L¯S ⊗ |init〉F )
=
√
1
3
∣∣h¯〉
L¯
⊗ |↓〉
S
⊗
∣∣∣∣−12
〉
F
+
√
2
3
|t¯〉
L¯
⊗
√
1
2
(
|↓〉
S
⊗
∣∣∣∣−12
〉
F
+ |↑〉
S
⊗
∣∣∣∣+12
〉
F
)
=
√
1
3
∣∣h¯〉
L¯
⊗
∣∣∣∣−12
〉
L
+
√
2
3
|t¯〉
L¯
⊗
√
1
2
(∣∣∣∣−12
〉
L
+
∣∣∣∣+12
〉
L
)
=
√
2
3
√
1
2
(∣∣h¯〉
L¯
+ |t¯〉
L¯
)
⊗
(∣∣∣∣−12
〉
L
+
1
2
∣∣∣∣+12
〉
L
)
+
√
1
12
∣∣ok〉
L¯
⊗
(
|ok〉
L
−
√
1
2
(∣∣∣∣−12
〉
L
+
∣∣∣∣+12
〉
L
))
.
(16)
where IL¯ is the identity operator on lab L¯. This equation
shows that the outcome (w¯, w) = (ok, ok) can occur with
probability 1/12, which is in agreement with Eq. (7) of
[1]. But the important point is: since all agents employ
the same theory, not only W , but also F¯ and W¯ are
fully aware of this equation too. Note that Eq. (16)
contains not only the term
√
1/2 (|−1/2〉
L
+ |+1/2〉
L
),
but also other terms such as |ok〉
L
. Thus it brings forth
the following question: when W is going to measure lab
L at time n : 30, which one is the correct description of
the state of L, Eq. (16) or Eq. (4)?
To answer the question, we must note that different
agents will have different point of view. Remind that W¯
and W both take the perspective that no collapse occurs
in measurements (otherwise our above point (1) applies),
and they do not know whether F¯ got r = tails or not
before performing their own measurements. Therefore,
following the same logic stated above that made Eq. (5)
valid, from W¯ ’s and W ’s point of view, all terms corre-
sponding to both
∣∣h¯〉
L¯
and |t¯〉
L¯
should remain. That is,
W¯ and W will take Eq. (16) as correct, so they will not
be surprised to find that the outcome w¯ = ok and w = ok
can occur in the same round.
But from F¯ ’s point of view, she knows that she got
r = tails. Thus it seems that she herself could take
Eq. (4) as the correct description. However, when she is
to infer the result of other agents, it will be a different
story. As she knows that “W does not know whether I
got r = tails or not” and they all use the same quantum
theory, if she is wise enough, she should be able to infer
that “W will take Eq. (16) instead of Eq. (4) as the
correct description of the state of L before performing
4his measurement”. As a result, F¯ should no longer make
Statement F¯n:02 that “I am certain that W will observe
w = fail at time n : 31.”. Instead, she should infer from
Eq. (16) that
Statement F¯n:02∗: “I am certain that when W¯ find
w¯ = ok at time n : 21, W will have a nonzero probability
to observe w = ok at time n : 31.”
Consequently, all those statements (especially State-
ments Fn:13 and W¯n:23) in Table 3 of [1] that were in-
ferred from the old Statement F¯n:02 will no longer hold.
Also, when agent W¯ find w¯ = ok, he can make his own
judgement from Eq. (16) directly that
Statement W¯n:23∗: “I am certain that W will have a
nonzero probability to observe w = ok at time n : 31.”
Therefore, the inconsistent results will no longer exist.
In other words, if F¯ insists that both Eqs. (4) and
(5) are the correct description of the states of the cor-
responding systems even from W ’s point of view, then
she is in fact not using the same quantum theory consis-
tently throughout the whole Gedankenexperiment. That
is, upon writing the state of L¯⊗S as Eq. (5), she is taking
the perspective that no collapse of wavefunctions occurs
in measurement, so that both the terms corresponding
to |↓〉
S
and |→〉
S
exist. But when she think that Eq.
(4) is the correct description of the state of lab L even
from W ’s point of view (so that she can infer Statement
F¯n:02), she actually take collapse into her picture because
only the term corresponding to |→〉
S
remains in Eq. (4)
while the term corresponding to |↓〉
S
disappeared. This
is how the inconsistent results were introduced.
In summary, if we take the perspective of point (1)
that wavefunctions will collapse when being measured,
then Eqs. (4) and (5) are incorrect. Else if we take the
perspective of point (2) that all measurements can be
phrased as a unitarily-interacting process so that Eqs.
(4) and (5) can remain valid, then Statement F¯n:02 be-
comes incorrect. Either way, the inconsistent conclusions
in [1] come from its own faulty reasoning, and not from
quantum theory itself.
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